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In the 1980s, corporate America increased its indebtedness at a fantastic
rate, ballooning the corporate debt burden from $829 billion in 1980 to $2.1
trillion in 1990.' Companies that had financed their debt through the use of
high-yield "junk bonds" eventually felt the weight of this mountain of new
debt such that, by 1991, nearly 15% of all junk-bond companies were in
default and many others were in serious financial distress.2 As a result,
companies increasingly tried to restructure their obligations in out-of-court
workouts rather than face costly and time-consuming formal bankruptcy
proceedings.3 One popular form of out-of-court workout that emerged was the
debt-for-debt exchange offer, in which a company would offer new obligations
with more forgiving payment terms in exchange for more burdensome existing
obligations.4 If enough bondholders accepted the offer and tendered their
bonds, the company could escape bankruptcy's costs and delays, and thereby
distribute a higher payout to its creditors. These out-of-court workouts have
generally been heralded as an efficient and cost-saving way for troubled
companies to restructure their debts.5
I. Thomas McCarroll, Carry That Weight, TIME, Nov. 19, 1990, at 79, 79.
2. Edmund Faltermayer, The Deal Decade: Verdict on the '80s, FORTUNE, Aug. 26, 1991, at 58, 60;
see also John J. Curran, Hard Lessons from the Debt Decade, FORTUNE, June 18, 1990, at 76.
3. See, e.g., Allen L. Weingarten, Consensual Non-Bankruptcy Restructuring of Public Debt Securities,
23 REv. SEC. & COMN.ODmEs REG. 159, 159 (1990) (noting "a greater emphasis on developing effective
and cost-efficien[t] ways of restructuring troubled companies").
4. See Marc S. Kirschner et al., Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The Deleveraging Tool of the '90s
in the Wake of OlD and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 643, 645 (1991) (writing that "[flor
publicly traded debt.., such workouts have most commonly taken the form of consensual exchange
offers .... [in which] creditors swap existing debt instruments for substitute debt instruments").
5. See Stuart C. Gilson, Managing Default: Some Evidence on How Firms Choose Between Workouts
and Chapter 11, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1991, at 62 (detailing inefficiencies of bankruptcy); cf.
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On January 11, 1990, Judge Burton Lifland of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in
In re Chateaugay Corp.,6 which critics charged created a significant
disincentive against use of the debt-for-debt exchange offer in prebankruptcy
workouts. Judge Lifland ruled that bondholders who participated in the LTV
Corporation's prebankruptcy debt-exchange offer held claims equal only to the
fair market value of the old debt that was exchanged, rather than the face
amount of the new debt.7 Critics of the ruling argued that it would severely
discourage creditors from participating in an exchange offer because they
would be reluctant to have their bankruptcy claims reduced. 8 A new term,
"LTV risk," was coined to describe the fear creditors supposedly had of
participating in exchange offers after the Chateaugay decision.9 Critics argued
that this discouragement to creditors ran counter to the Bankruptcy Code's
policy of encouraging out-of-court workouts.'0
In 1992, after the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision,
the Second Circuit overruled it." Specifically, the court held that, for the
purpose of calculating claims, no reduction in the amount of the claim should
occur when debt of equal face value is exchanged. The court reasoned that the
Bankruptcy Code does not place such an obstacle in the way of out-of-court
restructurings.12 The Fifth Circuit, using similar logic, has reached the same
conclusion.
13
This Note argues that critics of the bankruptcy court decision in
Chateaugay, and the courts of appeals who were influenced by these critics,
ignored the economic substance of debt-for-debt exchange offers and created
a claims-valuation regime directly contrary to the Bankruptcy Code. Whereas
the Bankruptcy Code mandates that the face value of a bond shall not affect
Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in Reorganization, 44 J.
FIN. 747 (1991) (examining effects of bankruptcy on operational efficiency); Roger H. Gordon & Burton
G. Malkiel, Corporation Finance, in How TAxEs AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 131, 163-72 (Henry Aaron
& Joseph Pechman eds., 1981) (enumerating sources of bankruptcy costs and estimating their magnitude).
But cf. Robert A. Haugen & Lemma W. Senbet, The Insignificance of Bankruptcy Costs to the Theory of
Optimal Capital Structure, 33 J. FIN. 383 (1978) (arguing that bankruptcy costs have been overestimated).
6. In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 B.R. 51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 130 B.R. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 961 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1992).
7. Id. at 58..
8. See, e.g., Weingarten, supra note 3, at 163.
9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1248-49
(1991); Richard L. Epling, Exchange Offers, Defaults, and Insolvency: A Short Primer, 8 BANKR. DEV. J.
15, 44 (1991).
10. See Chad C. Coombs, Original Issue Discount in Debt-for-Debt and Debt-for-Stock Exchanges,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 649 (1991); Robin E. Phelan & Stacey Jemigan, The "LTV Risk": Bankruptcy Court
Disallows "OLD" [sic] Created in Exchange Offer, in REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 1991, at 51, 62 (PLI Real Est. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 366, 1991).
11. Chateaugay, 961 F2d 378 (2d Cir. 1992).
12. Id. at 383.
13. Texas Commerce Bank v. Licht (In re Pengo Indus.), 962 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1992).
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the bankruptcy claim of a debt instrument, 14 the Chateaugay reversal
necessarily implies that the face amount of a debt instrument issued in the
context of an exchange offer determines the bankruptcy claim associated with
the new instrument. The courts of appeals disregarded the plain language of
the Code in an attempt to encourage successful out-of-court workouts. This
Note argues, however, that the reversal of Chateaugay was unnecessary for
out-of-court workouts to remain a viable alternative to bankruptcy.
This Note first discusses the concept of original issue discount and how
it has typically been interpreted in the bankruptcy setting. It then offers an
explanation of Judge Lifland's analysis in Chateaugay and examines the
analysis the appellate courts used in reaching contrary opinions. Next, the Note
evaluates the two approaches to original issue discount in exchange offers and
concludes that the bankruptcy court decision was improperly overruled. This
Note argues that the appellate courts misinterpreted the economic
underpinnings of a debt-exchange offer and fashioned a rule that creates
enormous confusion and that may yield highly inequitable results if carried to
its logical conclusion. Finally, the Note proposes that the promotion of out-of-
court workouts-the sole reason for the Second Circuit's reversal-can be
successfully accomplished through exchange offers in which the newly offered
debt is senior to the old debt and this subordination is enforced in bankruptcy.
The biggest threat to a successful exchange offer is a lack of creditor
participation. This Note argues that creditors would be willing to participate
in exchange offers that reduce their claims in bankruptcy if they could be
reasonably assured that their bankruptcy recovery would be greater than the
recovery of holdouts.
I. ORIGINAL IsSUE DISCOUNT AND ITS LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
The intrinsic economic value of a bond is equal to the present value of the
coupon payments plus the present value of the principal payment at maturity,
all discounted at the market rate of return that corresponds to the risk
characteristics of the security. When the market rate of return is more than the
stated coupon rate, the market will discount the price of the bond, and the
bond will trade for less than its face value. Such a bond is said to be selling
at a "discount" from face value. The amount by which the face value exceeds
the actual issuing price is called "original issue discount" (OID). 5 Original
issue discount is therefore nothing more than a market adjustment to reflect the
14. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1994).
15. See JAMES C. VAN HORNE & JOHN M. WACHOWICZ, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 74-94 (8th ed. 1992) (discussing valuation of long-term securities); Kirschner et al., supra
note 4, at 649-50; cf. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. United States, 130 F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1942)
("Ordinarily, bonds are issued at a discount because the promised rate of interest is, due to the condition
of the prevailing market, too low to sell them at par.").
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difference between the face value of a bond and its issuing price. As such, the
discount represents the additional interest that accumulates over the life of the
bond in excess of the interest paid out as coupon payments.' 6 Bankruptcy
Code § 502(b) explicitly prohibits asserting a claim for such unmatured
interest. 7 For example, suppose Company A issued bonds with a face amount
(amount due at maturity) of $1000 for an issue price of $700. Such bonds have
$300 of original issue discount.
In bankruptcy, interest stops accruing on the date the petition for relief is
filed. To the extent that on a given date interest has not yet accrued, it is
classified for bankruptcy purposes as "unmatured." The legislative history of
§ 502(b) recognizes that the face amount of a bond is an inappropriate measure
for valuating the claim of a creditor. Congress believed that the more
appropriate measure was the sale price of the bond, i.e., the dollar amount
loaned to the debtor, plus any interest that has accrued since the date of
issue.'8 Thus, bonds issued at a discount contain "unmatured" interest to the
extent that the face value exceeds the issue price; this unmatured interest is
amortized over the life of the bond such that at maturity the market value of
the bond eventually "catches up" to the face value. Courts have consistently
held that unamortized original issue discount is unmatured interest and
therefore is not an allowable claim.19 If Company A in the above example
16. In Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 55, Judge Lifland accurately explained:
If the proceeds from a particular issue are less than the face amount of the debentures, the
"market" is telling the issuer that the stated rate of interest is too low, and the differential
between consideration paid for the debenture and the amount received by the purchaser at
maturity is intended to compensate the purchaser for buying a debenture with a stated interest
rate below market levels.
17. Section 502(b)(2) of the Code states that the bankruptcy court is to allow a creditor's claim "except
to the extent that ... such claim is for unmatured interest." II U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1994). Because interest
is compensation for the use of money for a period of time, the Code will not allow a claim for the use of
money over a period of time that has yet to come.
18. See Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 54-55. The legislative history of § 502(b)(2) reads:
Paragraph (2) requires disallowance to the extent that the claim is for unmatured interest as of
the date of the petition. Whether interest is matured or unmatured on the date of bankruptcy is
to be determined without reference to any ipso facto or bankruptcy clause in the agreement
creating the claim. Interest disallowed under this paragraph includes postpetition interest that
is not yet due and payable, and any portion of prepaid interest that represents an original
discounting of the claim, yet that would not have been earned on the date of bankruptcy. For
example, a claim on a $1000 note issued the day before bankruptcy would only be allowed to
the extent of the cash actually advanced. If the original discount was 10 percent so that the cash
advanced was only $900, then notwithstanding the face amount of the note, only $900 would
be allowed. If $900 was advanced under the note some time before bankruptcy, the interest
component of the note would have to be prorated and disallowed to the extent it was for interest
after the commencement of the case.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 352-53 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6308-09;
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5848.
19. See In re Public Serv. Co., 114 B.R. 800, 803 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) ("The word 'interest' in the
statute is clearly sufficient to encompass the OID variation in the method of providing for and collecting
what in economic fact is interest to be paid to compensate for the delay and risk involved in the ultimate
repayment of monies loaned."); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 247, 250 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989)
("The facts of the instant case fit squarely within the example contained in the legislative history. The
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were to declare bankruptcy immediately after issuance of the securities,
§ 502(b) would only permit holders of the securities a claim of $700 in
bankruptcy. Section 502(b) would not allow a claim for the $300 of original
issue discount. Commentators generally agree that this reduction in claim is the
appropriate and equitable treatment of purchasers of bonds issued at a
discount.20 Such a policy makes perfect sense, for there is no reason that the
Bankruptcy Code should favor those creditors who purchase discount bonds
over those who purchase bonds at par or at a premium. The principle of
equitable distribution of claims to creditors includes the notion that value
received for a bond is the fairest measure of what is owed and, hence, the
proper measure of the creditor's claim.
Not all new debt instruments are issued for cash, however. In a debt-for-
debt exchange offer, bondholders surrender old debt in exchange for new debt
of the issuing corporation.2' Prior to the Chateaugay decision, no court had
ruled whether original issue discount could occur for claims-valuation purposes
in a debt-for-debt exchange offer in which the new debt has a face value in
excess of the market value of the surrendered instrument. From a purely
economic perspective, such transactions do generate OID because the face
amount of the new bonds exceeds what the bonds are worth when issued.
However, original issue discount is also a legal construct, and courts are
empowered to refuse to recognize OID, even when it may exist economically,
if such recognition would otherwise violate bankruptcy policy. If bankruptcy
courts are to hold that an exchange offer generates original issue discount,
tendering creditors will have claims in bankruptcy equal only to the market
value of the old securities. Thus, recognition of OID in a debt-for-debt
exchange offer has the potential to make tendering creditors worse off than
those who hold out if the debtor later files for bankruptcy.
There is, therefore, the potential for conflict between the competing
concerns of accurately valuing the claims of creditors subsequent to an
exchange offer and ensuring that out-of-court workouts are not unduly
discouraged by such a valuation regime. When presented with this dilemma,
Judge Lifland stressed the importance of economic substance and held that an
legislative history is clear; original issue discount is unmatured interest which is disallowed under I I U.S.C.
§ 502(b)(2)."). Judge Lifland, in his Chateaugay decision, stated:
Unmatured interest is without question not an allowed claim under § 502(b)(2) of the Code. The
dispute arises when we have the concept of OID which in economic reality is interest, but not
specifically denominated as such. It is therefore determined that semantics should not distort the
rationale and purpose of the Code and that, in the fact situation before this Court, unamortized
original issue discount on a note or debenture is indeed unmatured interest which is not an
allowable claim under Code § 502(b)(2).
Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 55.
20. See, e.g., Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 650-53; Nicholas P. Saggese et al., A Practitioner's
Guide to Exchange Offers and Consent Solicitations, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 527, 550 (1991) ("In other
words, the rule protects the debtor and its other creditors from the assertion of claims for amounts in excess
of the benefit actually conveyed to the debtor.").
21. See, e.g., Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 645.
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exchange offer can generate original issue discount.22 Two years later, the
Second Circuit held that bankruptcy policy favoring out-of-court settlement of
claims dictates that an exchange offer does not generate original issue
discount.23 This Note proposes that an exchange offer can create original
issue discount when the face amount of the new debt is greater than its market
value at issuance, but that this recognition of ODD does not kill the potential
for successful out-of-court restructurings. This Note proposes that the negative
incentive of OID recognition can be offset by positive incentives that facilitate
workouts.
II. THE CHATEAUGAY DECISION
In July 1986, the LTV Corporation and sixty-six of its subsidiaries and
affiliates filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.24
Prior to entering bankruptcy, LTV attempted an out-of-court workout through
an exchange offer of old notes for new senior notes.25 After filing for
bankruptcy, LTV moved pursuant to § 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code for
an order disallowing claims by holders of the new senior notes to the extent
that such claims represented unmatured interest.26 Judge Lifland granted
LTV's motion for partial summary judgment.27 In reaching this decision,
Judge Lifland first looked to the economic substance of an exchange offer,
concluding that original issue discount should arise and, second, argued that
out-of-court workouts would not be unduly burdened by recognition of OID.28
In his memorandum decision, Judge Lifland began by determining that
original issue discount clearly represents unmatured interest and is not an
allowable claim under § 502(b)(2).29 Judge Lifland then considered whether
an exchange offer could create OID. In deciding that it could, he relied on the
memorandum opinion in In re Allegheny International, Inc. 30 In Allegheny,
22. Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 57 ("Consistent with the legislative history, the essential factor guiding
this Court in making its determination of allowability is the underlying economic substance of the
transaction.").
23. Chateaugay, 961 E2d at 382-83. ("[G]iven Congress's intent to encourage consensual workouts
and the obvious desirability of minimizing bankruptcy filings, we conclude that... no new OlD is created
in a face-value debt-for-debt exchange in the context of a consensual workout.").
24. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994).
25. Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 52. As of December 1982, LTV had issued a total face amount of
$150,000,000 of debentures with a coupon rate of 13.875% due December 1, 2002 (the "old notes"), for
which it had received proceeds of $133,002,000, or 88.67% of face value. In May 1986, LTV offered to
exchange $1000-face-amount 15% senior notes due January 15, 2000 (the "new notes"), plus 15 shares of
LTV common stock, for each $1000 of old notes. As of June 1, 1986, old notes with a face amount of
$116,035,000 were exchanged for the new notes and the common stock, such that the face amount of the
new notes issued was also $116,035,000.
26. Id. at 53.
27. Id. at 58.
28. Id. at 56.
29. Id. at 55.
30. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
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the issuer had offered debentures in exchange for preferred stock,31 and the
court had held that original issue discount was created during the exchange to
the extent that the face value of the new debentures exceeded the market value
at which the new debt traded on the day after issuance, which was equal to the
market price of the preference stock tendered.32 Although in Chateaugay the
new debt was offered in exchange for old debt and in Allegheny the new debt
had been offered in exchange for stock, Judge Lifland decided that Allegheny
applied because the new notes were new securities, not merely modifications
of the old debentures.33 Judge Lifland also relied on certain tax and
accounting authorities to inform his view of the "underlying economic
substance" of the transaction,34 although he conceded that "[t]he applicable
treatment for tax or financial accounting purposes is not conclusive."35
The court gave weight to the fact that the exchange was voluntary, noting
that the offering circular accompanying the exchange offer included a warning
of the potential reduction in bankruptcy claims that could come from
participating in such an exchange.36 Judge Lifland discounted the potential
negative impact his ruling might have on out-of-court workouts.37
31. Id. at 248. In 1977, Allegheny issued 5,466,093 shares of $2.19 cumulative preference stock. In
1984, Allegheny offered to exchange one subordinated 10.4% debenture due July 1, 2002 for each share
of preference stock. Id.
32. Id. at 253.
33. Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 56 (stating that considering the exchange "a 'bookkeeping' entry that
should not be accorded any economic or legal significance .... is a "strained interpretation of the facts
[that] flies in the face of even a cursory reading of the instruments. Maturity dates, interest rates, and
sinking fund requirements have all been changed in the New Notes.").
34. Id. at 55.
35. Id. at 57. Judge Lifland cited I.R.C. § 1273(b), which requires debtors to recognize OID in initial
debt offerings. See Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 55. At the time of the Lifland decision, I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4)
governed debt issued in an exchange transaction and did not require recognition of OID. See Saggese et
al., supra note 20, at 552 n. 12. Since the Lifland decision, § 1275(a)(4) has been repealed, and debtors
are required to recognize OID during an exchange. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-508, § 1 1325(a)(2), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-466 to -467. Judge Lifland also cited APB OPINION
No. 21 (Am. Inst. of CPAs 1971), which requires recognition of OID on debt issued but does not apply
to debt issued during an exchange offer. See Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 55. The proper authority is
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 15 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1977)
(FAS 15), which typically does not allow recognition of OlD during exchange offers. ld. 16. However,
when additional consideration such as equity is offered, as in the Chateaugay case, FASI5 requires OID
to be recognized. Id. 19.
36. Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 56. The relevant discussion of such risks in the offering circular dated
May 1, 1986 read:
"Consummation of the Exchange Offer may have significant bankruptcy consequences for
holders of New Securities. In general, a note, bond or debenture represents a potential
bankruptcy claim equal to its face amount, plus accrued and unpaid interest through the date
of commencement of the bankruptcy case, less unamortized original issue discount, if any ....
To the extent that the Exchange Offers involve the issuance of New Notes at an original issue
discount, exchanging holders may have a smaller bankruptcy claim immediately thereafter than
at present."
Id. (quoting offering circular).
37. Judge Lifland pointed to the offering circular in claiming that "a lesser or greater than felicitous
treatment of specific claims in bankruptcy has always played a part in 'workouts', and undoubtedly
participants will continue to carefully weigh the risks and rewards to be gained from such efforts." Id. at
56 (footnote omitted). However, Judge Lifland did not offer any additional support for the claim that
The Yale Law Journal
Furthermore, he rejected the respondent's contention that his ruling would
necessarily extend to create OID in other instances such as compromised trade
debt; he rebuffed that concern by stating that the treatment of notes or
debentures is not analogous to the treatment of all other obligations.38
Judge Lifland concluded by examining the concept of "interest" and
recognizing that interest is simply compensation for the use of money.
According to Judge Lifland, under circumstances in which the face amount of
new debt exceeds the market value of the debt that was exchanged, the
difference is simply an analogous form of compensation. Hence, Judge Lifland
determined that the new notes were essentially bonds with original issue
discount.
39
For example, assume Company A issued bonds with $1000 face amount,
not in exchange for $700 in cash, but in exchange for old securities with a
market value of $700. Under Judge Lifland's ruling, holders of the newly
issued securities would have a claim of $700 in bankruptcy because the value
tendered for the new securities was worth $700 at the time of purchase. The
$300 difference represents original issue discount.
III. CRITICISM OF CHATEAUGAY AND SUBSEQUENT REVERSAL
The Chateaugay opinion was greeted with outrage by economists, legal
scholars, and the popular press. With striking unanimity, those critics claimed
that the ruling would stifle out-of-court workouts and would inevitably lead to
greater numbers of costly bankruptcy proceedings. They strongly urged that the
case be overruled on appeal.40 The Second Circuit obliged. After the district
court affirmed,4' the Second Circuit reversed in April 1992, claiming that no
original issue discount is created in face-value debt-for-debt exchanges.42 The
court based its ruling primarily on the bankruptcy policy of promoting out-of-
workouts tend to produce unfavorable bankruptcy results for workout participants, regardless of OID
treatment.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 56-57. Judge Lifland wrote:
Consistent with the legislative history, the essential factor guiding this Court in making its
determination of allowability is the underlying economic substance of the transaction. Under the
circumstances presented here this Court finds that the New Notes and the Old Debentures were
issued at a discount and that the discount represented unmatured interest.
Id. at 57.
40. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 10, at 673 ("The LTV decision is wrongly decided."); Saggese et
al., supra note 20, at 549 (stating that "[t]he result reached in the LTV decision is inappropriate and
extremely unfair"); Lawrence A. Weiss, The Bankruptcy Code and Violations of Absolute Priority. J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1991, at 71, 78 ("[T]he LTV case should be reversed or changed by
Congress.").
41. Chateaugay, 130 B.R. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
42. Chateaugay, 961 F.2d 378, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1992).
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court workouts.43 Two months later, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar
conclusion in Texas Commerce Bank v. Licht (In re Pengo Industries).
4
Critics of the bankruptcy court's Chateaugay decision argued that
recognition of OID during an exchange offer inappropriately penalized
creditors willing to cooperate in the workout process. Because only the
creditors who participated in a workout would have their claims marked to
market, while holdouts would have unaltered claims, critics maintained that the
Chateaugay decision would give uncooperative creditors a windfall at the
expense of those who tender.45 These writers unanimously argued that
Chateaugay was wrongly decided because it penalized participation in
exchange offers.4 6 Critics also argued that the bankruptcy court misinterpreted
the economic substance of the exchange offer, claiming that a face-value
exchange offer does not alter the fundamental economic relationship between
the debtor and its bondholders. 47 Moreover, these critics charged that the
bankruptcy court ruling was unworkable because it would necessarily extend
to all payment modifications. In accordance with the wishes of these writers,
the Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court decision. The Second Circuit
was apparently highly influenced by the vocal critics of the Chateaugay
decision; the court repeatedly cited the writings of Marc Kirschner and others
in the reversal.48
The Second Circuit opinion, penned by then-Chief Judge Oakes, began by
upholding the lower court's determination that original issue discount
represents unmatured interest under § 502(b)(2), specifically citing the
legislative history of that portion of the Code.49 Thus, the court concluded
that the OID on the old debentures was not an allowable claim. But the court
parted company with Judge Lifland on the issue of creation of OID in the
exchange offer and determined that no additional OID was created by the debt-
for-debt exchange.50 In reaching its conclusion, the court looked primarily to
43. Id. See In re Colonial Ford, 24 B.R. 1014, 1015-17 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), which offers a detailed
analysis of how the Bankruptcy Code promotes out-of-court workouts. "Congress designed the Code, in
large measure, to encourage workouts in the first instance, with refuge in bankruptcy as a last resort." Id.
at 1015. Also see the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179-80 ("Most business arrangements, that is,
extensions or compositions (reduction) of debts, occur out-of-court. The out-of-court procedure, sometimes
known as a common law composition, is quick and inexpensive." (footnote omitted)).
44. 962 F2d 543, 546-51 (5th Cir. 1992).
45. See Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 658; Saggese et al., supra note 20, at 549-50.
46. See Coombs, supra note 10, at 659; Epling, supra note 9, at 46-47; Kirschner et al., supra note
4, at 658; Saggese et al., supra note 20, at 549.
47. See Kirschner et al., supra note 4 at 656 ("[S]ince Chateaugay involved a face value exchange,
the actual liability of the debtor to its old and new bondholders remained the same .... "); Saggese et al.,
supra note 20, at 550-51 ("Mhe market value of the surrendered security on the date of the
exchange ... has nothing to do with the value the debtor received from the issuance of the target debt
security.").
48. See Chateaugay, 961 F.2d at 381-83.
49. See id. at 380-81; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (legislative history of § 502(b)).
50. See id. at 382-83.
1996] 2217
The Yale Law Journal
the policy of promoting out-of-court workouts but also assessed the economic
substance of a face-value debt-for-debt exchange as a maintenance of an
existing debt.5'
The court distinguished a "market value exchange" from a "face value
exchange," the difference being that in a market-value exchange the new bonds
have a "reduced principal," while in a face-value exchange the new bonds do
not alter the face amount of the old securities. 2 Judge Oakes adopted the
distinction between so-called face-value and market-value exchanges that was
developed in the Kirschner article, paraphrasing Kirschner in the opinion. 3
The court classified the exchange made by LTV as a face-value exchange
because the principal amount due at maturity of the new notes remained
unaltered, notwithstanding that the coupon rate and date of maturity did
change.4
After acknowledging that the bankruptcy court had used the plain meaning
of original issue discount in its opinion,55 Judge Oakes stated that "the
bankruptcy court's logic ignores the importance of context, and does not make
sense if one takes into account the strong bankruptcy policy in favor of the
speedy, inexpensive, negotiated resolution of disputes. 5 6 Again paraphrasing
Kirschner, the appeals court claimed that the bankruptcy court ruling would
discourage creditors from cooperating in a workout by reducing the claims of
cooperating creditors in bankruptcy in a manner that would unfairly grant a
windfall to holdouts who do not tender.5 ' The court held that a reversal of the
51. See id.
52. Id. at 381-82.
53. See id. at 382; Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 645-47. Kirschner stated:
Typically, one of two strategies is adopted in exchange offers for public debt. The first is an
attempt to capture the market "discount" that debentures may be trading at in the marketplace
by offering to exchange an existing debt instrument for a new debenture with a reduced
principal amount-the "fair market value exchange." The second is an attempt to extend and/or
modify payment terms of existing debentures, but not reduce their principal amount, in order
to allow the troubled company more time to recover from its financial problems-the "face
value exchange."
Id. at 645-46.
54. Chateaugay, 961 F2d at 382.
55. See id. ("The bankruptcy court's ... application of the definition of OID to exchange offers may
seem irrefutable at first glance .....
56. Id.
57. Id. Kirschner wrote:
[The Chateaugay decision exacerbates the holdout problem in an exchange offer by penalizing
those creditors who do participate in an exchange offer and providing even greater rewards for
those who do not. By revaluing only the face value exchang[e]r's claim downward while
leaving the holdout's claim intact, the court creates a windfall for the non-exchanging holdout
in a subsequent bankruptcy. The result also creates a windfall for the company by relieving its
debt measured by the additional OID. Thus, Chateaugay gives creditors a disincentive to
cooperate with a struggling debtor in a consensual workout and gives an artificial benefit to the
debtor.
Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 658.
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bankruptcy court decision was necessary if exchange offers were to be a viable
alternative to Chapter 11.58
The court recognized that a market-value exchange could reduce a
bankruptcy claim, but the court stated that a face-value exchange does not
create OID because the exchange "does not change the character of the
underlying debt, but reaffirms and modifies it."'59 The court concluded that the
economic substance of a face-value debt-for-debt exchange-as opposed to a
market-value exchange-is not a reduction in liability, and held that OID
cannot be generated where there is no underlying change in liability.60 Thus,
Judge Oakes distinguished the Allegheny case, which involved a debt-for-stock
exchange that increased the company's liability, from the LTV case, in which
the company's liability remained unchanged. 61 Finally, the Second Circuit
refused to apply tax authorities to determine the appropriate bankruptcy policy
toward OID. Once again referring to the Kirschner article, the court stated that
the "tax treatment of a transaction ... need not determine the bankruptcy
treatment." 62 The court concluded that since the legislative history of § 502(b)
did not explicitly require recognition of OID in a face-value exchange, the
court would not infer such a catastrophic intention.63
For example, assume Company A issued bonds with a $1000 face amount
in exchange for old securities with a market value of $700 and a face amount
of $1000. Under the Second Circuit ruling, holders of the newly issued
securities would have a claim of $1000 in bankruptcy because the new
securities have a face amount of $1000. The $300 difference in value between
the face amount of the new securities and their market value would not be
recognized as OID.
58. Chateaugay, 961 F.2d at 382. On that point, the court cited articles by Coffee and Klein and by
Kirschner. Coffee and Klein wrote that the bankruptcy court decision would "chill exchange offers" because
"[b]y accepting the exchange offer, the creditor sacrifices the difference between the face amount of the
securities given up and the lesser fair market value of the securities received." Coffee & Klein, supra note
9, at 1249 n.121. Kirschner noted that "[t]he Chateaugay decision has made it far less attractive for public
debt holders to participate in a proposed face value exchange by, in effect, penalizing such holders for their
participation." Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 647.
59. Chateaugay, 961 F.2d at 382.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 383.
62. Id. Kirschner wrote:
While the bankruptcy laws are concerned with maintaining the relative differences in status and
priority among similarly situated creditors, the tax laws are concerned with establishing a
consistent system of accounting for increases and decreases in wealth of discrete taxpayers, in
order to impose a tax on their respective net increases.
He added that the tax system is based on realization events, and the exchange offer is one such event.
"Therefore, although an exchange offer may present a proper time to tax the participants, that fact is not
relevant in the bankruptcy analysis of the relationship that similarly situated creditors have to one another
and to the debtor." Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 656.
63. 961 F2d at 383. Judge Oakes wrote that the court, "[i]n the absence of unambiguous statutory
guidance .... will not attribute to Congress an intent to place a stumbling block in front of debtors seeking
to avoid bankruptcy with the cooperation of their creditors." Id.
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The Fifth Circuit, citing nearly the same authorities that appeared in the
Second Circuit's opinion, reached an identical conclusion with respect to face-
value debt exchanges. The facts of the Pengo case, however, differed
somewhat from the LTV case.64 In Chateaugay, old debentures were tendered
for new, senior interest-bearing securities plus common stock, whereas in the
Pengo case old debentures were exchanged for two senior classes of
convertible, non-interest-bearing securities. In both instances, however, the
appellate courts considered the transactions to be face-value exchanges because
the face value of new debt was the same as that of the old, and held that no
OID could be created in such face-value exchanges. 65
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ECONOMICS OF EXCHANGE
OFFERS AND BANKRUPTCY POLICY FAVORING WORKOUTS
This Note suggests that the proper legal treatment of OIlD generated during
an exchange offer should (1) faithfully reflect the underlying economic
substance of the transaction and (2) maintain the viability of out-of-court
restructurings. It argues that the Second and Fifth Circuits erroneously
abandoned a literal interpretation of original issue discount in a noble effort to
promote the efficacy of exchange offers. In fact, their rulings are based on
faulty assumptions and create more problems then they solve. Original issue
discount occurs whenever the face value of a newly issued obligation exceeds
the value surrendered in payment for it. This Note claims that it is appropriate
to recognize OID whether the new obligation is purchased with cash or by
surrendering old securities. This Note suggests that the recognition of OID
created during an exchange is both true to the economic substance of the
64. See Pengo, 962 F.2d at 544-45. In 1980, Pengo Finance issued $22,500,000 of 8.5% convertible
debentures due in 1995. The debentures were purchased at their face value, i.e., with no OID. In 1983,
neither Pengo Finance nor its guarantor, Pengo, could make the interest payments on the old debentures.
In 1985, Pengo Finance offered to exchange one $500-face-amount Class A debenture and one $500-face-
amount Class B debenture, neither of which bore interest, for each $1000-face-amount old debenture. The
new debentures were senior to the old debentures, they matured in 1991 (four years earlier than the old
debentures), and they could be converted for Pengo's common stock more favorably than the old
debentures. Approximately 59% of the old debentures were tendered, but in late 1988 and early 1989
involuntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 were filed against Pengo. Id.
65. Id. at 547-49. ("The 1989 bankruptcy court decision of In re Chateaugay created an enormous
disincentive for investors to participate in consensual out-of-court restructurings and, thus, spurred
movement of financially troubled companies into the bankruptcy courts."). The Fifth Circuit, with analysis
similar to the Second, rejected the Chateaugay bankruptcy court ruling on policy grounds and relied heavily
on the published writings of legal scholars, noting that Judge Lifland's decision "produced a swift response
from commentators who aggressively scrutinized its analysis of the original issue discount question in the
face value exchange context and observed its effect on consensual out-of-court restructurings." Id. at 548.
The Fifth Circuit also declined to decide whether OID could be created in a fair-market-value exchange,
which it defined as a transaction in which "the holders exchange a debt instrument for a new debt
instrument with a lower face amount." Id. at 550. The court held that the exchange of non-interest-bearing
securities for interest-bearing securities represented a face-value exchange when the principal due at
maturity remained unchanged. Id. at 547. Also, the Fifth Circuit indicated that the tax treatment of debt
exchanges is not informative in the bankruptcy context. Id. at 550-51.
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transaction and is unnecessary to advance the goal of promoting out-of-court
workouts.
Section A of this part argues that the Second and Fifth Circuits, and the
commentators on which they relied, appear to have ignored the economic
substance of exchange offers. A debtor attempts an exchange offer because it
is unable to meet its obligations to bondholders in a timely fashion. In an
exchange offer, creditors agree to reduce their claims against the debtor,
usually through an extension of payment terms, because they understand that
in a bankruptcy proceeding they would likely receive even less value for their
bonds. The end result of such an exchange offer is that the debtor reduces its
payment obligations to creditors who exchange. Otherwise, it would have been
pointless for the debtor to undertake such an offer.66 The economic substance
of any exchange offer is thus a reduction in liability.
The distinction that Kirschner and the courts of appeals drew between
face-value exchanges and market-value exchanges is truly a distinction without
a difference. The appellate courts erroneously concluded that an exchange offer
with original issue discount, the face-value exchange, is fundamentally
different from an exchange offer with no OID, the market-value exchange. In
reality, the economic substance of both types of exchange is a reduction in
liability. By holding that a face-value exchange cannot create OID, the
appellate courts promulgated a legal rule that contradicts the Code's prohibition
on valuing claims by the face value of a security. Unfortunately, the Second
and Fifth Circuits have likely opened the door for needless litigation over an
economic triviality, the face value of a bond.
Section B proposes that the value surrendered in payment for a debt
obligation, not the face amount of the obligation, should determine the
bankruptcy claim associated with the obligation. Whereas the courts of appeals
value the claims of debt issued in an exchange offer by the face amount of the
new debt, the appropriate bankruptcy claim valuation is the market value
surrendered in payment. However, if there is no forfeiture of the holder's
rights under an obligation, and the old obligation simply undergoes a
modification or extension, the creditor's bankruptcy claim should not be altered
because the creditor did not purchase a new obligation. Thus, only when a
creditor surrenders all rights under an obligation in exchange for a new
obligation should the bankruptcy claim be marked to market. Any concern that
the bankruptcy court decision would necessarily apply to all liability
66. See, e.g., Epling, supra note 9, at 17. Epling noted:
In general, three types of exchange offers exist: a composition, where debt or interest rates are
written down; an extension, where maturities and amortizations are extended; and a cash tender,
where the bonds are exchanged for some number of cents on the dollar. Of course, an exchange
also can involve combinations of these three basic options. The purpose... stems ... from
debt service which is outstripping cash flow.
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restructurings is mistaken. This Note proposes a limitation of Judge Lifland's
ruling to instances in which a new security is created and a novation has
occurred; contract, tax, and securities law already detail when such a new
security is created.67
Section C argues that the reversal of the bankruptcy court's decision in
Chateaugay was both insufficient and unnecessary to advance the policy goal
of promoting out-of-court workouts. It proposes that the holdout problem can
best be eliminated through the exchange of new securities that are contractually
senior to the old debt and through the enforcement of this payment priority in
bankruptcy proceedings. Creditors would continue to participate in exchange
offers without the reversal of Chateaugay as long as participation was the best
strategy to recover maximum value for their investment. If, as in Chateaugay,
the new securities issued were contractually senior to the securities that were
exchanged, holdouts would appropriately be penalized by a decrease in their
probability of recovery should the debtor later enter bankruptcy.
A. Face-Value Versus Fair-Market-Value Exchanges-
An Erroneous Distinction
Both the Pengo and Chateaugay circuit court decisions relied heavily on
the determination that the exchange offers at issue were "face value"
exchanges." Both opinions cited Kirschner's Deleveraging Tool article as the
source of the definition of a face-value exchange, as opposed to a fair-market-
value exchange. Kirschner wrote that relatively healthy companies undertake
face-value exchanges to relieve problems with short-term liquidity. As such,
a face-value exchange "is an attempt to extend and/or modify payment terms
of existing debentures, but not reduce their principal amount, in order to allow
the troubled company more time to recover from its financial problems."69 In
contrast, a fair-market-value exchange purportedly capitalizes on the reduced
price at which old debentures are trading. In such an exchange, a new
debenture is issued "with a reduced principal amount," which enables a
company "to reduce its overall debt obligations. 70
Kirschner's distinction between face-value exchanges and fair-market-value
exchanges rests on the narrow issue of whether the new debt has the same
principal amount as the old. However, there is no legitimate basis for placing
such enormous weight on so irrelevant a distinction. One can construct a bond
with any face amount and with any given market value by modifying the
67. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
68. Pengo, 962 F.2d at.549; Chateaugay, 961 F.2d at 382.
69. Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 646-47.
70. Id. at 646.
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coupon rate and the date of maturity.71 Any "fair market value" exchange
contemplated by Kirschner could easily be changed to a "face value"
exchange, without altering the debt burden, by increasing the face amount of
the new bonds and lowering the coupon rate, i.e., by increasing the original
issue discount on the new bonds. For example, assume Company A wishes to
restructure outstanding bonds with $1000 face amount and $700 market value.
If Company A offered $1000-face-amount bonds with a $700 market value, the
exchange would be considered a "face value" exchange. If Company A offered
$700-face-amount bonds with a $700 market value, the exchange would be
considered a "market value" exchange.
Both face-value and market-value exchanges reduce the liability of the
debtor, though in face-value exchanges the new obligations have original issue
discount equal to the difference between the market value of the old securities
and the face amount of the new ones. Under the Kirschner face-value/market-
value distinction, there is no reduction in bankruptcy claims from face-value
exchanges, while there is a claims reduction from market-value exchanges. By
stating that the value of a claim should be determined "notwithstanding the
face amount, ' 72 however, the legislative history of Bankruptcy Code
§ 502(b)(2) specifically guards against letting the face amount of an obligation
determine the amount of the claim. Congress fully understood the gross
inequity of treating differently two creditors who paid the same amount for a
bond simply because one creditor purchased a bond with more original issue
discount. By promulgating a legal rule that prefers the purchasers of discounted
bonds, the courts of appeals have directly contradicted the legislative history
of the statute they interpreted.
Both the Pengo and Chateaugay appellate court decisions are excellent
examples of how difficult it is to apply the supposed distinction between a
"fair market value" exchange and a "face value" exchange. Kirschner wrote
that, in a fair-market-value exchange, bondholders typically receive "at least
some additional consideration (such as equity in the company) as an
inducement to tender."73 In Chateaugay, the exchange offer included not just
bonds of the same face value but also fifteen shares of common stock.74 The
court of appeals disregarded this fact, however, and maintained its assertion
that the transaction was a face-value exchange. Perhaps the fifteen shares were
not enough additional consideration to push the transaction to the market-value
exchange category; by not articulating any standard for bankruptcy judges to
71. See, e.g., VAN HORNE & ,VACHOWICZ, supra note 15, at 77-79 (demonstrating how varying
coupon rate generates bonds with value greater or less than face value).
72. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 352-53 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6308-09; see supra note 18.
73. Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 647.
74. Chateaugay, 961 F.2d at 380.
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use, the Second Circuit opened the door for senseless litigation over how much
additional consideration constitutes a market-value exchange transaction.
The Pengo court held that the exchange of interest-bearing securities for
non-interest-bearing securities is a face-value exchange because "'the overall
debt obligation of the company has not been altered."' 75 But the agreement
of creditors to forgive interest payment on debt is every bit as much a
reduction in "debt obligation" from the debtor's perspective as it is when
creditors accept a reduction in principal. The existence of efficient capital
markets to borrow and invest funds requires this be true.76 Therefore,
distinguishing "face value" exchanges from "market value" exchanges by
whether the debt level has been reduced is impossible.
Both appellate courts declined to rule whether a reduction in claims may
occur in a market-value exchange, although the Second Circuit noted that
marking claims to market in such circumstances "might make sense." 77 If the
courts of appeals are to be consistent with the analysis of Kirschner that they
relied on for their treatment of face-value exchanges, however, then a market
valuation in bankruptcy of market-value exchanges would necessarily follow,
because in a market-value exchange the debtor "is able to reduce its overall
debt obligations., 78 A market-value exchange is the functional equivalent of
repurchasing outstanding debt on the open market and funding the repurchase
by issuing new bonds.79 Therefore, in bankruptcy, holders of the new bonds
from a market-value exchange would have claims only equal to the cash value
of the old bonds that were tendered because the exchange of the old bonds was
economically equivalent to a cash purchase.80
Furthermore, no court could allow a claim in bankruptcy that is greater
than the payment requirement of the debt obligation in question. For example,
assume that Company A previously issued at par $1000-face-amount notes that
now have a market value of $700. Company A exchanges these notes for $700-
face-amount notes with a market value of $700. At maturity the $700-face-
amount notes will pay $700; thus, the maximum claim that would be allowable
in bankruptcy pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 1124 for the holder of such an
obligation would be $700. Courts are therefore very likely to rule that holders
of bonds issued in a market-value exchange have claims in bankruptcy equal
to the market value of the bonds that are tendered. There is thus the potential
75. Pengo, 962 F.2d at 548 (quoting Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 647).
76. The value of debt is equal to the sum of discounted value of the stream of coupon payments and
principal. A reduction in face amount or coupon rate therefore reduces debt. See, e.g., VAN HORNE &
WACHOWICZ, supra note 15, at 76-80.
77. Chateaugay, 961 F.2d at 382.
78. Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 646.
79. Cf id. at 645-46 (describing a market-value exchange as "an attempt to capture the market
'discount' that debentures may be trading at in the marketplace by offering to exchange an existing debt
instrument for a new debenture").
80. For a discussion of the valuation of such claims, see supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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for pointless litigation over whether a transaction was a face-value exchange
or a market-value exchange, and it will be impossible to create a legal rule that
could appropriately distinguish between the two. A face-value exchange is
nothing more than a market-value exchange with original issue discount.
Therefore, because market-value exchanges require market valuation of claims
in bankruptcy, and face-value exchanges are economically indistinguishable
from market-value exchanges, face-value exchanges should have market
valuation of claims in bankruptcy, as they did in Judge Lifland's decision.
Moreover, in promulgating a legal rule based on the economically
irrelevant face-value/market-value distinction, the appellate courts have
promoted exchange offers of identical face values over other exchange offers
that may receive less preferential treatment in bankruptcy. In an exchange
offer, bondholders would be willing to pay a higher amount for bonds of the
same face value relative to bonds of lower face value that, in the absence of
the appellate rulings, would have had the same market value. There is no
policy reason why a court should encourage companies to offer more or less
original issue discount on bonds in exchange offers. The court should allow
debtors to restructure debt with payment terms that best match their forecasted
liquidity. Kirschner recognized that companies commence exchange offers with
more or less original issue discount depending on the reason for the
restructuring."' Companies will enter so-called face-value exchanges, with a
reduction in coupon rate and/or extension of maturity, when current interest
expense is outstripping cash flow, but will enter market-value exchanges, with
reduction in principal amount, when repayment of principal is too
burdensome. 2 The Chateaugay reversal effectively precludes any exchange
offer with a reduction in principal amount, however, because such exchanges
would have less favorable treatment in bankruptcy relative to exchanges with
the same face value. For a company otherwise best suited to a "market value"
exchange, the Chateaugay reversal may lead to unnecessary financing, tax, and
hedging costs when the obligation terms of the restructuring are not properly
matched with the company's expected cash flow.
B. The Slippery Slope Fallacy
A concern of many of the Chateaugay bankruptcy decision's critics was
that the ruling necessarily extended to all payment modifications.83
Specifically, commentators suggested that for Chateaugay to be logically
consistent, original issue discount must be recognized whenever a creditor's
claim is adjusted, such as in a debt extension. 4 This concern is unfounded,
81. Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 645-47.
82. Id.
83. See Epling, supra note 9, at 44; Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 657.
84. See Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 657-58.
1996] 2225
The Yale Law Journal
however, because Chateaugay only applied to exchange offers that created a
new security. Original issue discount recognition should only occur in such
instances when a security is originally issued. If a payment modification does
not create a new security, it is improper to recognize OID.
A holder of a debt instrument should be treated the same whether the
instrument was purchased with cash or by surrendering an old security. It is
appropriate to recognize original issue discount whenever the value surrendered
in payment is less than the face amount of the new obligation. However, if a
debt restructuring does not entail the surrender of an old obligation and the
purchase of a new one, the restructuring should not alter the bankruptcy claim
of the holder of the debt instrument because the restructuring does not create
a new liability.
It may be argued that all payment modifications, whether creating a new
security or not, result in a decrease in the debtor's indebtedness because of a
reduced debt service burden. At first blush, the recognition of OID only when
a new security is created may therefore appear arbitrary. However, only when
a new obligation is created and the old obligation is extinguished is a company
receiving new value. Because payment modifications not constituting a new
security do not forgo the right to collect under the old security, the corporation
has received no new value from the creditor. As claims in bankruptcy are only
permitted for the value tendered to the debtor (plus any accrued interest), it is
therefore only appropriate to value a claim by the prior market value of a
security when such previously existing security was surrendered as payment
for a new obligation. Thus, OID recognition is appropriate only when the face
amount of a new security exceeds the value surrendered in payment. Under the
Second Circuit rule, however, no OED is recognized in face-value exchanges
even though the debtor has received in payment for the new obligation an
instrument worth less than the new instrument's face value.
The interpretation of an exchange offer as a novation and an issuance of
a new security can be used to distinguish inapposite scenarios that critics of
the bankruptcy court in Chateaugay claimed necessarily followed from Judge
Lifland's ruling. Critics charged that his holding could impede attempts of
debtors and creditors to modify the terms of any obligation and could create
needless litigation as to what constitutes original issue discount. 85 For
example, critics posited that for Judge Lifland's analysis to be consistent it
must also apply to the renewal of notes or the extension of a loan.86 Such
85. See Coombs, supra note 10, at 664; Saggese et al., supra note 20, at 551.
86. See Epling, supra note 9, at 44 (arguing that debt exchanges should be treated the same as debt
extensions); Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 657-58 ("[Tlaken to its logical extreme ... the Chateaugay
analysis could ... require that every general unsecured creditor's claim that has been modified or otherwise
adjusted be fixed at the fair market value of that claim on the date of bankruptcy."); Phelan & Jemigan,
supra note 10, at 61 ("[Olne must also apply the concept [described in Chateaugay] to all other creditors,
including banks and other holders of claims that renew notes or extend obligations.").
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concern is unfounded, for Judge Lifland's opinion applied solely to exchange
offers in which an entirely new obligation is created, not ones in which an old
obligation has been modified. 7 Therefore, exchange offers can readily be
distinguished from other debt payment modifications, e.g., the restructuring of
a loan, in which no novation occurs and no separate obligation is created.
Where there is no new obligation, no new OID need be recognized. It is not
unworkable, as critics allege, for Chateaugay to apply only to such instances
in which a new security is indeed issued.
In an exchange offer, a creditor agrees to surrender a preexisting security
for newly issued debt in satisfaction of the previous claim. 8 Such a voluntary
substitution of one obligation for another constitutes a novation. Four elements
are required for a novation to take place: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2)
an agreement of all the parties to extinguish the old contract; (3) a valid new
contract; and (4) agreement of the parties to the new contract.89 In a debt-for-
debt exchange offer, all of the elements of a novation are clearly met. First, the
old debt that is exchanged is a valid contract. Second, issuance of new debt is
conditioned on the surrender of the old debt in the exchange and a waiver of
the right to payment under the old securities. Third, the newly offered debt is
a valid contract. Fourth, in an exchange offer, both parties agree to accept the
payment terms of the newly issued securities. Thus, the surrender of old debt
for new debt in the context of an exchange offer clearly results in a novation.
Payment modifications such as the extension of a loan or a renewal of a
note do not result in a novation. It is well-settled law that the giving of a new
note for a debt evidenced by a former note does not extinguish the old note
unless such is the intention of the parties.9" In a consummated debt tender
offer the intent to substitute one security for another can be clearly inferred,
but in a loan modification agreement such intent is lacking.
Similarly, securities law and tax law both consider a debt-exchange offer
to be a sale of a new security, not an alteration of an existing security, while
the extension of a loan is not.9' This further conflicts with the Second
Circuit's assertion that a debt-for-debt exchange "reaffirms and modifies"
87. Chateaugay, 109 B.R. at 56 (stating that decision does not apply to "all other kinds of obligations
of the debtor including compromised trade debt and trade discounts").
88. See Ford Lacy & David M. Dolan, Legal Aspects of Public Debt Restructurings: Exchange Offers,
Consent Solicitations and Tender Offers, 4 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 49, 50 (1991).
89. See, e.g., Town & Country Linoleum & Carpet Co. v. Welch, 392 N.Y.S.2d 517, 518 (App. Div.
1977).
90. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Daniel, 701 F.2d 141 (11th Cir. 1983).
91. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) (1994). Case law has clearly established that the
exchange of a new security for an existing security constitutes a "sale" under the Securities Act because
the economic relationship between debtor and creditor is thereby fundamentally altered. See United States
v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1946); United States v. Riedel, 126 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1942);
see also Rev. Rul. 73-160, 1973-1 C.B. 365 (controlling whether taxable exchange of securities occurred);
17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1995) (controlling when alteration of security creates new security within meaning
of § 2(3) of Securities Act).
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existing debt.92 Section 2(3) of the Securities Act defines "sale" as including
"every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for
value."93 Although the definition of sale does not explicitly include an
exchange, courts have found the exchange of securities to be a sale.94
Moreover, the existence of § 3(a)(9) and 3(a)(10), which exempt certain types
of exchanges from the Securities Act, evidences Congress's view that an
exchange of securities is a sale.95 It is clear that a sale occurs when a security
holder voluntarily surrenders the instrument and receives an entirely different
instrument.96 In addition, the alteration of a security effectively creates a new
security when the alteration has substantially affected the legal rights and
obligations of the outstanding securities. 97
For tax purposes, a debt-for-debt exchange offer is a realization event in
which cancellation-of-indebtedness income may arise.9' Tax law considers the
material modification of a debt instrument to be an exchange of debt
instruments.99 Thus, a change in interest rate, taken alone or in combination
with a change in maturity, will generally be deemed to be an exchange,1°°
whereas a payment extension will generally not be deemed to be one.'0'
Moreover, the creation/modification dichotomy proposed in this Note is a
far more tenable distinction for determining recognition of OID during an
exchange offer than the face-value/market-value dichotomy proposed by
Kirschner. Whereas the distinction between the creation of a new security and
the modification of an old security is based on established principles of law,
the face-value/market-value distinction runs directly counter to the bankruptcy-
law mandate to value claims irrespective of their face amount. The creation/
modification distinction is perhaps as economically trivial as the face-
value/market-value distinction, because both debt exchanges and debt
modifications reduce indebtedness. However, the creation/modification
distinction is a necessary byproduct of a legal world that differentiates between
new and preexisting relationships.
92. Chateaugay, 961 F.2d at 382.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1994).
94. Riedel, 126 F.2d at 83 ("[Olne may sell a security and be paid therefor in cash, or in another
security, or in any other object of value such as a house .... ).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9)-(10) (1994); see RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 399 (6th ed. 1987).
96. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 95, at 399.
97. See Philip Palmer McGuigan & William P. Aiken, Jr., Amendment of Securities, 9 REV. SEC. REG.
935, 935 (1976).
98. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10) (1994). Section 108(e)(10) provides that, for purposes of determining
cancellation of indebtedness income, a debtor issuing an instrument in satisfaction of indebtedness "shall
be treated as having satisfied the indebtedness with an amount of money equal to the issue price of such
debt instrument." Id; see Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 658-59.
99. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1001-1(a) (1995) ("Except as otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Code, the
gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other
property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained.").
100. See Rev. Rul. 89-122, 1989-2 C.B. 200; Rev. Rul. 81-169, 1981-1 C.B. 429.
101. See Rev. Rul. 73-160, 1973-1 C.B. 365.
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C. The Holdout Problem and an Alternative Solution
The primary reason the Second and Fifth Circuits rejected Judge Lifland's
Chateaugay decision is that they were concerned that the bankruptcy court
ruling would render out-of-court workouts ineffective. No bondholder, the
appellate courts reasoned, would rationally participate in a debt-for-debt
exchange offer if he knew that his bankruptcy claim would be reduced after
tendering. 10 2 The appellate courts feared that the bankruptcy court ruling had
exacerbated what had come to be known as the "holdout problem."'1
0 3
"Holdout problem" is the term used to describe a structural disincentive
for creditors to participate in an exchange offer. Because an exchange offer
leaves a debtor more able to pay residual creditors in full, there exists an
incentive for creditors to "hold out" and not tender. If enough bondholders
refuse to participate in an exchange offer, the workout fails and the company
must enter bankruptcy, leaving all parties worse off.'0
4
It was widely asserted that Judge Lifland's decision put an additional
obstacle in front of bondholders considering participation in an exchange offer
by potentially reducing their claims in bankruptcy. 10 5 Anecdotal evidence
from bankruptcy practitioners suggests that, after the Chateaugay decision,
successful out-of-court workouts were indeed more difficult to achieve.
0 6
Despite the reversal of Chateaugay, however, commentators have noted that
Chapter 11 remains the most popular method of restructuring companies.
10 7
Observers of the holdout phenomenon have postulated that it can be
mitigated through the use of techniques that render tendering debtholders better
off than the holdouts. 0 8 Specifically, commentators have claimed that issuing
new debt that is senior to the old debt can reduce the holdout problem, for
"[i]n the event of bankruptcy, the newly-created senior debt will be entitled to
payment before the old debt."'01 9 Economists Robert Gertner and David
Scharfstein have developed a mathematical model of the decision to tender in
102. Texas Commerce Bank v. Licht (In re Pengo Indus.), 962 F.2d 543, 549 (5th Cir. 1992)
("Creditors faced with the choice of either refusing to exchange or accepting the exchange offer would
certainly realize that if they choose to exchange, their claim in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding would
shrink by the amount of unamortized OID."); Chateaugay, 961 F.2d at 382 ("[The Chateaugay] ruling
creates a disincentive for creditors to cooperate with a troubled debtor....").
103. See Coffee & Klein, supra note 9, at 1248; Gilson, supra note 5, at 67; Kirschner et al., supra
note 4, at 662. See generally Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232
(1987) (describing holdout problem and techniques to mitigate it).
104. See Roe, supra note 103, at 236.
105. See, e.g., Kirschner et al., supra note 4, at 658.
106. See, e.g., Mark A. Hershey, Note, Face Value Exchanges, Original Issue Discount, and
Elimination of the "LTV Risk": In Re Chateaugay Paints a Legal Landscape, 38 VILL. L. REv. 801, 817
(1993); Barbara Franklin, A Boost to Workouts, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16, 1992, at 5.
107. See Lillian E. Kraemer & Richard B. Paige, Consensual Workouts-Bankruptcy Alternative for
the 1990s?, in 14 BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW 251, 255-56 (Richard T. Nassberg ed.,
1994).
108. See, e.g., Coffee & Klein, supra note 9, at 1242-51; Roe, supra note 103, at 246-50.
109. Roe, supra note 103, at 247.
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a public debt restructuring and had concluded that bondholders will not hold
out if the newly issued security is senior to the old."0 Moreover, Gertner and
Scharfstein postulate that the newly issued security may have a lower value
than the old security and still eliminate holdouts, so long as the security is
senior."11
A common method of facilitating exchange offers in which the new debt
is senior to the old debt is the use of exit consent provisions, which have
become an increasingly popular tool to discourage creditors from holding out.
In many exchange offers, companies have attempted to amend the indenture
under which the old securities had been issued, either to strip the outstanding
bonds of protective covenants or to subordinate them to the new securities." 2
Debtors could accomplish this by requiring bondholders to vote to amend the
old securities before they could tender. Delaware courts have upheld the
legality of these exit consent provisions."13 In addition, the SEC has
consistently held that such modifications governing payment priority or
subordination do not result in the offer or sale of a new security under the
Securities Act, enabling such exchange offers to proceed without the
registration burdens associated with the issuance of a new security."
4
Economists have argued that bankruptcy courts should enforce the strict
priority of claims. They note that, to the extent that priority violations and their
attendant losses are anticipated by potential lenders, the cost of capital is
increased." 5 Legal scholars concur, noting that subordination agreements
should not be jeopardized in bankruptcy, the time when senior creditors depend
on such agreements. Clearly, subordination agreements are only meaningful
when a corporation becomes insolvent." 6 These agreements are an important
tool to enable debt-laden companies to borrow funds, and there is a broad
consensus that the full enforcement of subordination agreements fosters an
efficient raising of capital."
7
110. See Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization
Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1202-03 (1991).
111. Id.
112. Coffee & Klein, supra note 9, at 1211-12. This technique was successfully used in both the
Chateaugay and Pengo cases. See Chateaugay, 961 E2d at 380; Pengo, 962 F.2d at 545 ("The Old
Debentures were subordinated to payment in full of the New Debentures.").
113. See Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc. 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986); Kass v. Eastern Air Lines, No. 8700,
1986 WL 13008 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1986).
114. See Bryant B. Edwards & Jon J. Bancone, Modifying Debt Securities: The Search for the Elusive
"New Security" Doctrine, 47 Bus. LAw. 571, 601 (1992).
115. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 40, at 71.
116. See, e.g., Daniel C. Cohn, Subordinated Claims: Their Classification and Voting Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AMi. BANKR. L.J 293, 296 (1982) ("A subordination agreement would be
nearly useless if not enforceable in a bankruptcy case.").
117. See, e.g., In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit held
that failing to enforce subordination agreements in bankruptcy "would not only place in jeopardy literally
billions of dollars of outstanding loans, but in all probability would prompt lending institutions to
reconsider, and possibly curtail, their subordinated debt-financing activities to the detriment of the entire
business community." Id.
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As a practical matter, however, subordination agreements generally are not
fully enforced in bankruptcy."8 In bankruptcy, a debtor may propose a plan
for confirmation in which both senior and subordinated creditors receive partial
payment on their claims." 9 In addition, the Code provides that each impaired
class of claims must approve the plan by two-thirds in amount and a majority
in number for consensual confirmation. 20 If a subordinated class or other
impaired class of creditors contests confirmation of a plan, that plan can be
confirmed only with the use of a "cramdown,"'1' which often entails costly
litigation and delays. 22 The threat of forcing a cramdown is the key to
subordinated debt's "nuisance value," which enables subordinated debt to
extract value that the subordination agreement does not allow.1
3
Because any impaired class can force a cramdown, senior debt with OID
generated during an exchange offer has the power to force a cramdown if its
senior claim is not satisfied in full. Therefore, holders of senior debt are
equipped with the bargaining leverage in bankruptcy to ensure that they receive
greater satisfaction of their claims than do holdouts who possess the
subordinated debt. Junior creditors, on the other hand, cannot credibly use the
threat of forcing a cramdown to extract a payout greater than the payout for
the senior creditors. This is because, under a cramdown, a plan for
confirmation must satisfy the "fair and equitable standard" such that a
118. A recent study showed that strict priority was violated in almost 80% of consensual workouts
such that junior bondholders were paid a percentage of their claims even though senior creditors were not
paid in full. See Weiss, supra note 40, at 75-76. Recent bankruptcy court decisions, consistent with the
views of most scholars, have shown a willingness to enforce subordination agreements in bankruptcy. See,
e.g., In re Holly's, Inc., 140 B.R. 643 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992). The Holly's court noted that "there is
no settled black letter law regarding subordination agreements" and that there is "a relative lack of reported
bankruptcy cases which discuss subordination agreement issues in depth." Id. at 667. After reviewing
commentary and case law on the subject, the Holly's court concluded that "§ 510(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code and U.C.C. § 1-209 ... expressly permitfl enforceability of subordination agreements under
applicable state law." Id. at 679; see also In re Chicago, S. Shore & S. Bend R.R., 146 B.R. 421, 426
(Bankr. N.D. III. 1992) ("This agreement is typical of subordination agreements generally
enforced .... The terms are clear and the intent of the parties unequivocal. PB&T [junior creditor] is not
to receive payments from the Debtor until the [senior] Lenders are paid in full."). In November 1993, a
bankruptcy court ruling endorsed the literal interpretation of subordination agreements. See In re
Envirodyne Indus., 161 B.R. 440 (Bankr. N.D. IIl. 1993), aff'd, 29 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1994). The court held
that in the context of a reorganization, holders of subordinated debt could not receive any payment until
senior creditors were paid in full, stating:
The very purpose of subordination clauses is to allow holders of senior indebtedness to recover
if the debtor cannot meet its obligations. In other words, in the case of a bankruptcy or a
reorganization, the senior debt holders bargained to insure that they would recover on their
claim before any junior debt holder could recover on their claim.
Id. at 448.
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1994) governs the contents of a reorganization plan.
120. See id. §§ 1126(c), 1129(a).
121. Id, § 1129(b). When a plan can be confirmed only over the dissent of a class of creditors, a
special procedure known as a "cramdown" applies to protect dissenting classes. See Kenneth N. Klee, All
You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. LJ. 133,
134 (1979). The term "cramdown" refers to the fact that the dissenters' claims are adjusted downward
without their consent.
122. See Kraemer & Paige, supra note 107, at 301.
123. Id. at 300-01.
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dissenting senior class of creditors must be provided for in full before any
junior class can retain any property. 24 Thus, the nuisance value of
subordinated debt can extract some value from the senior creditors but not
enough to significantly compromise full payment of the senior debt. The senior
status of exchange offer participants grants them the power to hold up the plan
confirmation in bankruptcy unless their claims are satisfied to their satisfaction
vis- -vis the junior creditors.
The holdout problem could be averted through the use of subordination
agreements in exchange offers. Furthermore, the problem would not be
exacerbated by the bankruptcy court's Chateaugay decision, which reduces the
claims of tendering bondholders if creditors could expect that in bankruptcy
they would be paid a greater amount than bondholders who hold out. That is,
full or nearly full payment of a smaller claim would likely be preferred by
risk-averse creditors over an uncertain payment of a somewhat larger
subordinated claim, because in bankruptcy the most probable scenario would
be a greater recovery for the senior creditors.
A creditor will participate in an exchange offer only if it is the best
strategy to recover on his investment. It is true, as critics of the Chateaugay
decision allege, that a claim reduction in bankruptcy may be a disincentive to
participation in an exchange offer in which the new debt has the same payment
priority as the old debt. Creditors would be more likely to participate if there
were no claim reduction than they would be if there were one. If the old debt
is subordinated to the newly issued debt, however, the nominal-value
bankruptcy claim associated with the senior debt is a less significant factor in
the creditor's decision to tender than is payment subordination. The payment
priority of senior debt would induce creditor participation in an exchange offer
whether or not the senior debt's bankruptcy claim is marked to market, as in
Chateaugay, or is preserved at face value. Where there is an exchange offer
in which the new debt is contractually senior to the old, the Chateaugay mark-
to-market rule should not affect a creditor's strategic choice in most
conceivable instances.
At the time of a troubled debt restructuring, the old debt is trading at less
than face value because the expected value of the claim is less than the face
amount. That is, the market price incorporates the possibility that the claim
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) provides:
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect
to a class includes the following requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on account of
such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount
of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive
or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property.
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will not be paid in full. If a new security is issued that is senior to the old,
with the claim fixed at that market value, a tendering creditor has a senior
claim for the amount the market expects a holder of the old obligation to
receive. A tendering creditor would be worse off than a holdout in two
scenarios: (1) the restructuring is a complete success and creditors are paid in
full; (2) holdouts are paid a larger percentage of their claims in bankruptcy
than the market expected before the exchange.
In the first scenario, an avoidance of bankruptcy altogether, which drives
the holdout phenomenon in general, it is irrelevant whether bankruptcy claims
for tendering bondholders are valued at face or market value because the
company never enters bankruptcy. Thus, the Chateaugay mark-to-market rule
would not make tendering creditors any worse off than they would be with no
OID recognition. For example, assume Company A completed a face-value
debt-for-debt exchange such that its $1000-face-amount obligations, trading at
$700, are exchanged for new senior $1000-face-amount obligations with a
maturity extension. Under the Lifland decision, the tendering creditors would
have a bankruptcy claim of $700 and the holdouts would have a bankruptcy
claim of $1000; under the Second Circuit decision, both the tendering creditors
and the holdouts would have a bankruptcy claim of $1000. However, if
Company A is able to avoid bankruptcy, the reduction in claims of the
tendering creditors would not make them any worse off than under the Second
Circuit rule, because the tendering creditors would be paid in full if the
company avoids bankruptcy. Tendering creditors would be worse off than
holdouts if the company avoids bankruptcy because only tendering creditors
accepted the maturity extension.
The second scenario, a lesser payout to tendering creditors caused by
marking claims to market, is highly unlikely because the market valuation at
the time of the exchange incorporates the possibility that bankruptcy may be
avoided. With bankruptcy certain, the expected payout to creditors is in all
likelihood going to be less. Even with a tendering creditor's claim marked to
market, first-in-line satisfaction of this claim has a higher expected payout than
the likely payout on the old obligation with bankruptcy certain. For example,
assume Company A completes a face-value debt-for-debt exchange such that
its $1000-face-amount obligations, trading at $700, are exchanged for new
senior $1000-face-amount obligations with a maturity extension. Under the
Lifland decision, the tendering creditors would have a bankruptcy claim of
$700 and the holdouts would have a bankruptcy claim of $1000; under the
Second Circuit decision, both the tendering creditors and the holdouts would
have a bankruptcy claim of $1000. In this scenario, the Lifland rule favors
holdouts over tendering creditors more than does the Second Circuit rule only
if the company enters bankruptcy and has enough value in the estate to pay the
senior creditors $700 and the holdouts more than $700. This would be a highly
unusual event, because the old obligations should not have been trading at
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$700 if in bankruptcy the estate has enough value to pay out more than $700
per obligation. Generally, the price at which a debt instrument traded prior to
bankruptcy will exceed the payout on the instrument if the company enters
bankruptcy.
Thus, it would be a rare instance when the Chateaugay mark-to-market
regime would be the deciding factor for a creditor making the decision to
tender for senior securities. Creditors who weigh the risks and rewards of
participation in an exchange offer would, in most instances, agree to tender and
have their bankruptcy claims reduced as long as the new debt was senior to the
old. Therefore, if there is an exchange offer in which the old debentures,
through an exit consent provision, are subordinated to the new debentures,
bondholders who tender would likely be in a better position than holdouts in
the event of bankruptcy. The holdout problem should not be severe, even if
OID is generated during the exchange. As long as old debt is exchanged for
contractually senior debt, creditor participation in exchange offers would not
be impeded by Judge Lifland's Chateaugay decision.
CONCLUSION
Judge Lifland's Chateaugay decision was improperly overruled. The critics
who urged its reversal and the courts of appeals have failed to assess
accurately the underlying economic substance of a debt-exchange transaction
and have created a legal rule that is unworkable. It is likely that companies
will exploit the courts' mistaken emphasis on the face value of a bond by
issuing new debt with enough original issue discount such that the transaction
can be characterized as a "face value" exchange. Instead of marking claims to
market only when the principal amount of the indebtedness has been reduced,
bankruptcy claims should be determined by the market value surrendered to the
debtor in exchange for the new obligation. The sole justification for reversing
the bankruptcy court decision was to promote out-of-court workouts. The use
of senior debt in the context of an exchange offer, however, can advance the
efficiency goals of the courts of appeals without a reversal of Chateaugay.
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